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ABSTRACT

Rationalist research expects that groups claim credit for terrorism. Yet, the vast majority
of attacks are not claimed. Of the unclaimed attacks, about half are attributed to a
specific group. What factors impact claiming decisions? While extant literature largely
treats claiming as binary—either claimed or not—the present study disaggregates
claiming decisions further to also consider attacks with attributions of credit but no
claim, using data from 160 countries between 1998 and 2016. Both attack-level and
situational factors impact claiming decisions. Disaggregating claiming behavior shows
meaningful differences. Specifically, competitive environments and suicide attacks
increase claims but not attributions. Higher fatalities in general increase both claims and
attributions, but when the target is civilian attributions decrease with a high body count
whereas claims increase. Further, while the directional impact of other variables is the
same, the magnitude of their effects vary between claims and attributions. Results are
robust across modeling specifications. Findings demonstrate that our understanding of
claiming behaviors is limited when claiming is treated as dichotomous. This study
provides further insight into factors that impact claiming decisions for terrorism. Results
can address data issues in academic research and inform counterterrorism responses.
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Introduction
On October 29, 2004—over three years later—Osama bin Laden claimed credit for the
September 11th attacks.1 Intelligence agencies had long linked Al Qaeda to the attacks,
so why not claim credit initially? Since the 1800s, rebels have claimed responsibility for
their attacks to differentiate themselves from criminals.2 Rationalist literature has
generally assumed that groups claim credit because otherwise the purpose of the
violence may be obscured.3 Claiming credit for terrorism is easy and cheap, should the
perpetrators desire to do so. Yet, between 1998 and 2016, it appears that only 16.0% of
terrorist attacks in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) were claimed.4 The high

proportion of unclaimed attacks suggests that sending a signal through claiming may
not be central to terrorism. Instead, groups may be strategically deciding whether or not
to claim credit for their attacks.
While data show that groups claim credit for terrorism a small portion of the time, this
is an under-theorized phenomenon. Extant literature has focused on situational and
group-level factors to propose why some attacks are claimed while others
aren’t.5 These studies, however, have largely treated claiming as binary—claimed or
unclaimed.6 Yet, as LaFree, Dugan, and Miller note, many attacks are attributed to a
particular group even when the group does not explicitly claim responsibility.7 Indeed,
between 1998 and 2016, 26.8% of attacks in the GTD were in this middle ground—they
were not claimed but were still attributed to a specific group. The remaining 57.2% of
attacks in this time period were neither claimed nor attributed to a group.8
Despite the boom of research on terrorism, relatively little attention has been paid to
whether or not these attacks are claimed.9 Even fewer studies have addressed
unclaimed but attributed attacks.10 Yet, in the immediate aftermath of an attack, media
and the public focus on who is responsible or whether any group has claimed credit.
Since claiming is not the norm, this question often goes unanswered. Still, many
unclaimed attacks are credibly attributed to a particular group, which helps remove
some uncertainty following an attack. From a counterterrorism perspective, uncertainty
about who is responsible limits our understanding of violence and how to best respond.
Uncertainty can also breed fear among the public,11 even though unclaimed attacks are
actually quite common.
Since most attacks are unclaimed, we need a better theoretical and empirical
understanding of claiming decisions. Research on claiming decisions has implications
for scholarship, policy, and public reaction. Knowing when and why groups claim their
violence or have attacks attributed to them can improve academic data issues,
particularly for studies that use claims as a measure of a group’s activity. From this, we
can better predict when claims or attributions are likely, which can improve
counterterrorism responses. Additionally, greater public awareness that claiming
terrorism is rare can help remove some uncertainty in the aftermath of an attack.
The present study addresses this gap in the literature by testing factors that impact
claiming decisions for terrorism.12 The next section discusses what is meant by claiming
and why a group would claim an attack. The article then examines extant explanations
for why a group would commit a terrorist attack but not claim it, and explores how
attributions of responsibility impact these decisions. Next, the article offers and tests
rationalist explanations from the literature for when an attack is more likely to either be
claimed or be unclaimed but attributed to a group. Finally, the article concludes with a
discussion of the results and their limitations, policy implications stemming from these
findings, and future research directions.

Extant literature on claims and attributions
Why claim credit?
Brian Jenkins famously described terrorism as theater—an act performed for an
audience to get a response and support one’s goals.13 Rationalist literature suggests
that terrorism is a strategic act used to communicate a message.14 This literature
assumes that terrorism is perpetrated by rational actors who use costly signaling to
achieve goals. As Hoffman notes, terrorism has generally been committed by groups
with clear goals who claimed credit for their violence and often explained how attacks
further their objectives.15 As such, much of terrorism research has assumed that the
responsible group claims credit for its attacks since an attack alone is a poor form of
communication.16
Claiming occurs when actors publicly state that they are responsible for a terrorist
attack. For example, the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) perpetrated a number of attacks
aimed to stop predation of natural habitats during the late 1990s and early 2000s. ELF
often used notes to claim credit for these attacks. Spanning ideologies, groups ranging
from Sovereign Citizens, the Army of God, Al Qaeda, and countless others claim credit
for their violence. Claiming is easy and there are many potential benefits to doing
so.17 Claiming allows the group to signal to its adversaries or to otherwise send a
message that could help it achieve a goal. Claiming an attack generates attention and
publicity to one’s cause. Claiming also helps to prevent others from free-riding by taking
credit for another group’s work.18
While there are many reasons to claim credit for an attack, claiming can be
detrimental to a group. Groups that use terrorism ultimately want to survive.19 To
survive, groups have to balance the need to gain supporters with concerns about
backlash from the populace.20 Support can be explicit—such as providing resources or
recruiting militants—or implicit—such as silence or complacency to the group’s actions.
When threats to popular support increase, a group’s likelihood of survival
decreases.21 This, however, is a balancing act since groups also need to demonstrate
to potential supporters that they are worthy of support.22 As Pluchinsky posits, groups
will be less likely to claim attacks when doing so would damage their public image.23
We assume that the actors who claim an attack are actually the ones who committed
24
it. Yet, groups sometimes falsely claim credit for terrorism. Of course, we cannot know
how often this occurs, but certainly at least a small proportion of claimed attacks (16%
between 1998 and 2016) are claimed falsely. When a group falsely claims credit for
terrorism, it is likely an attempt to display strength even though the group may not
actually be able to carry out such an attack (see Kearns et al. 2014 [note 5 below] for
full discussion of false claiming as a rational action). Sometimes an attack is inspired by
a group that claims credit for it even though that group was not directly involved in its

planning or execution. In recent years, this phenomenon is often linked to the so-called
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), which has claimed credit for attacks where
no direct link can be found. These falsely claimed attacks generally occur in Western
countries where the group presumably does not have capacity to directly carry out an
attack but benefits from suggesting that it does. A few recent examples include: the
2016 Bastille Day attack in Nice, France25 that was likely inspired by ISIS but not
perpetrated in any direct coordination with the group; the 2017 Las Vegas
shooting26 that does not appear to have been influenced by ISIS in any way; and,
perhaps even more dubiously, a violent incident in a Filipino casino27 that turned out to
be a robbery, not terrorism. It is unclear whether lone wolves who operate separately
from groups like ISIS exhibit different claiming behaviors. Though, as Abrahms and
Conrad point out, lone wolves are responsible for a small proportion of terrorist
violence.28 Regardless, while there is no clear data on how commonly false claims
occur, they are often taken seriously by media, the public, and even governments.
Regardless of veracity, a group may be more likely to claim credit for an attack when
it expects to gain publicity or support without a high risk of repercussions from either the
population or the state.29 Yet, circumstances favorable to claiming an attack are not
always present. In many cases, it may be strategically advantageous to perpetrate a
terrorist attack but not to claim credit for it. The next section outlines conditions in which
attacks may not be claimed.
Why not claim credit?
Given the arguments for claiming terrorism and the ease of doing so, why would a
group perpetrate a terrorist attack and then decide not to claim credit for it? Extant
literature has focused on four potential explanations for when it is more
advantageous not to claim credit: a) situational factors, b) attack characteristics, c) the
group’s ideology, and d) the group’s goals. While each of these factors may impact
claiming decisions on their own, multiple factors are likely at play simultaneously. There
are myriad potential internal and external pressures on a group that impact claiming a
given attack. Further, terrorism involves information asymmetries that can result in
miscalculations about claiming. As part of broader political conflict, claiming decisions
can be both influenced by and subsequently impact how opponents react.30 This project
is not meant to oversimplify these pressures for every attack. Rather, its goal is to test
the impact that a combination of factors has on claiming decisions.
When an attack is not claimed, the message that it was meant to communicate may
either be lost or be ambiguous.31 Still, many unclaimed attacks are attributed to a
specific group. For example, an August 8, 2000 car bombing in Madrid is attributed to
Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) despite no claim of credit.32 Similarly, hundreds of groups
across the world have attacks attributed to them that they have not actually claimed.

When the group responsible is already linked to the attack through an attribution, it may
reduce the incentive for the group to later claim the incident. Yet, it begs the question of
why the attack was not claimed in the first place. Lying about terrorism by not claiming
credit can still send a signal and be a rational action when the perceived repercussions
of claiming outweigh the expected benefits.33 To date, scholars have generally not
attempted to explain attributed attacks despite their relative frequency (see Rorie, 2008
[note 6 below] for an exception). The present study addresses this gap in the literature
by examining factors that impact whether an attack is claimed or is unclaimed but
attributed to a specific group.
When should attacks be claimed or attributed?
Competition
Scholars have posited that a group’s decision whether or not to claim an attack is
directly related to factors in the group’s operating environment that impact its
interactions with other actors. Hoffman argued that claiming is more likely when there is
increased competition, up to a point of diminishing returns.34 In a study of Israel alone,
he found support for this argument. However, in a study of global terrorism, Wright
found that competition did not impact claiming in any region.35
When more groups are operating in the same place simultaneously, outbidding
becomes more important for a group’s survival,36 even when other factors make
claiming the attack less appealing. Competitors vie for support from the population, so
perpetrating and claiming an attack signals that the group is strong and worthy of
support. Claiming should be even more likely when multiple groups attack similar
targets. In these situations, it would be unclear which group was responsible unless the
perpetrators claim the attack.37 More competitive environments may incentivize groups
to collaborate, in which case multiple claims could be truthful.38 Competitive
environments may also increase false claiming, where multiple groups say they
perpetrated the attack but at least one is lying.39 Regardless, outbidding necessitates a
claim, so we should expect to see fewer unclaimed attacks in more competitive
environments. While unclaimed attacks should be less frequent, when they do occur it
may be more difficult to identify which group is responsible. Thus, attributions for
unclaimed attacks should be less frequent when there are more active groups. This
leads to the following expectations:
Hypothesis 1:.As the number of groups increases, the likelihood that an attack is
a. claimed increases.
b. attributed decreases.
Competition can also be measured by recent violence in the country. There are two
theoretical pathways for how the level of recent violence would impact claims and
attributions. On one hand, when there have been more recent attacks in a country, the

population will be on edge.40 Generating fear and unease among the population can be
accomplished with or without a claim of credit.41 However, more recent violence may
increase the risk of backlash from both the population and the state. When the risk of
reprisal is higher, groups should be more inclined to hide their involvement.42 Still, in a
more violent environment, a group may perpetrate an attack but hope the incident is not
connected back to them. Here, the population will be more inclined to seek answers and
identify the responsible party, which would increase attributions. On the other hand,
more competitive environments are also noisier,43 so claims may get lost and
attributions for any particular attack may be less likely. Both theoretical pathways would
lead to less claiming. The impact of a noisy environment on attributions, however, may
be mixed and produce no significant difference on average since one mechanism
should increase attributions while the other depresses them. This leads to the next
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2:.When there were more attacks recently, the likelihood that an
attack is
a. claimed decreases.
b. attributed is not impacted on average.
Attack characteristics
The decision whether or not to claim an attack may be due to characteristics of the
incident itself. Simply put, some attacks are more appealing to claim credit for than
others. Claiming decisions can be made either before the attack is perpetrated or after
the fact, especially if the attack did not go according to plan. In this vein, scholars have
posited that groups are less likely to claim credit when the attack failed44 or when there
are high fatalities.45
Terrorist attacks are, on average, more lethal in recent decades.46 Killing a few
people may be seen as acceptable, whereas both no fatalities and high body counts
become riskier for a group and can impact claiming decisions in similar ways.47 On one
hand, there may be little incentive to claim credit for attacks without fatalities.48 While
high body counts are far from the only goal of terrorism, attacks that do not kill anyone
could be viewed as failures.49 In this case, claiming could signal incompetence and thus
be counterproductive. Similarly, in the absence of fatalities, there may be less incentive
for the public or the state to conduct a thorough investigation out of which an attribution
would be made. On the other hand, when an attack kills a large number of people, the
group likely would face increased backlash from both the population and the
state.50 Thus, we should expect fewer claims when the death toll is higher. At the same
time, there will be more incentive to find the group responsible for the attack, so we
should see more attributions for unclaimed attacks. In short, claims and attributions
should both be less likely when fatalities are lower and higher. From this, I expect:
Hypothesis 3:. There will be a quadratic relationship between fatalities and

a. claims.
b. attributions.
Scholars have suggested that attacks against hard targets like the military51 and
diplomatic missions52 will be claimed more often.53 Military and diplomatic targets are
viewed as less innocent than civilians since they are armed and engage in combat.
Additionally, the ability to attack a hard target demonstrates the group’s strength.54 For
these reasons, claims should be more likely. Attacks against military or diplomatic
targets will also garner maximum attention from the government. These attacks will be
investigated more thoroughly and should be attributed to a group more frequently. From
this, I expect that:
Hypothesis 4:.When the target is military or diplomatic, the likelihood that an
attack is
a. claimed increases.
b. attributed increases.
Of course, when considering the impact of fatalities on claiming decisions, it also
matters who is killed.55 Killing large numbers of people—particularly civilians—sends the
message that nobody is safe.56 Accordingly, high fatality attacks will likely generate
greater backlash from the population since civilians are viewed as more
innocent.57 Additionally, attacks on soft targets—where the body count could be
higher—are relatively easy as compared to hard targets. As such, attacks on soft
targets do not signal strength in a way that would clearly generate more support than
backlash. Still, targeting civilians should increase public outrage and motivation to
identify the perpetrators. From this, I expect:
Hypothesis 5:. When the attack kills a high number of civilians, the likelihood that
an attack is
a. claimed decreases.
b. attributed increases.
In contrast, high fatality attacks against military or diplomatic targets signal strength
and capability that should outweigh fears of backlash from the public or the
state.58 When attacks against military or diplomatic targets are not claimed, the state
would still be motivated to find the group responsible. From this, I expect:
Hypothesis 6:.When the attack kills a high number of military or diplomatic
targets, the likelihood that an attack is
a. claimed increases.
b. attributed increases.
Research suggests that suicide attacks are more likely to be claimed.59 Suicide
attacks demonstrate the most extreme form of commitment to a cause, which implies
that the group is strong and deserving of support. Suicide attacks also attract a good
deal of attention, which garners notoriety. For these reasons, suicide attacks should

have more claims.60 Additionally, by definition a suicide attack leaves the body of the
perpetrator. In some cases, the body can be identified and thus could be tied back to
the group responsible, so deciding not to claim credit could be futile. Suicide attacks
also spread fear, which is double-pronged. According to the GTD, most suicide attacks
target either civilians or state agents, which can lead to repercussions from both the
public and the government. Conversely, suicide attacks may also generate support by
communicating a message that you are either with the group or against them.
Furthermore, suicide attacks can generate support if the bomber’s family receives
praise for their sacrifice. While there are many reasons to claim credit for a suicide
attack, some of these attacks will not be claimed. When this occurs, there are incentives
to attribute the attack to a group to minimize fear stemming from uncertainty among the
public. Additionally, since suicide attacks are relatively rare and are committed by a
smaller percentage of the overall groups that use terrorism, it may be easier for these
attacks to be attributed when they are not claimed. This leads to the final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7:. When the incident is a suicide attack, the likelihood that an attack
is
a. claimed increases.
b. attributed increases.
Table 1 summarizes factors that I expect to impact claiming decisions and the
expected directionality of these relationships.
Table 1. Summary of the expected impact of each independent variable on the
outcomes (Table view)
Hypothesis Factor
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

□Groups
□ Recent Attacks
Fatalities
Military/Diplomatic Target
Fatalities* Civilian Target
Fatalities* Military/Diplomatic
Target
Suicide Attack

Impact on
Claiming
a. □
a. ↓
a. ∩
a. □
a. ↓
a. □

Impact on
Attribution
b. ↓
b. no impact
b. ∩
b. □
b. □
b. □

a. □

b. □

Group characteristics
Several group-level factors—such as ideology and goals—may impact whether or not
an attack is claimed.61 Of Kydd and Walter’s five strategic logics of terrorism, outbidding
is the only one that necessitates that a group claims credit for its attacks.62 Any of its

other strategic logics (attrition, intimidation, provocation, and—perhaps especially—
spoiling) can be accomplished without claiming. Group structure may also impact
claiming. Hierarchically structured groups may be susceptible to principal-agent
problems that can impact claiming.63 Claiming also may be influenced by a group’s
position relative to opponents and by the number of rivals operating in the same
space.64
While group-level factors likely impact decisions about claiming credit for terrorism, it
is difficult—if not impossible—to empirically evaluate them. Hoffman addresses this
issue by creating ratio variables for the percentage of groups of a particular ideology
and the percentage of groups with state sponsorship in Israel in each year.65 Given the
global focus of this paper, it is not feasible to replicate his approach. Alternatively,
Abrahms and Conrad included group-level variables—state sponsorship and Islamist
ideology—in some of their models.66 Since group-level factors can only be measured for
attacks where the perpetrator claims credit, these models have a substantially reduced
number of observations and the results may be biased due to the non-randomness of
these missing values. By definition, these group-level factors are unknown when the
attack is unclaimed. Even when an attack is attributed to a group, we cannot know
group-level factors with a high degree of confidence. Thus, group-level factors are
excluded from this paper.
Methodology
Data
This project combines data from three sources: the GTD;67 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset;68 and, Vreeland’s adaptation69 from the Polity IV scale.70 To test the
hypotheses, I use event-level data between 1998 to 2016 from the GTD, which only
includes terrorism by sub-national actors. Over this 19-year period, the GTD reported
102,914 terrorist attacks in 160 countries. If terrorism by state actors was also included,
the number of attacks would be higher and patterns of claims and attributions could
reasonably be different. I discuss this more in the conclusion.
Key variables
The outcome of interest in this study is claiming decisions. The GTD codes whether or
not an attack was claimed.71 When an attack is unclaimed but attributed72 to a group,
then the GTD’s “claimed” variable is coded as 0 but there is a group listed in the “group
name” variable. Finally, when the GTD codes an attack as unclaimed and there is no
group listed in the “group name” variable, then it is truly an unclaimed attack. I recoded
these three mutually exclusive categories in the single outcome variable used in
analyses: 0 = unclaimed; 1 = claimed; or, 2 = attributed. Table 2 presents descriptive
statistics for all variables included in the models.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics by attack (Table view)
Variable
Dependent Variables
Unclaimed
Claimed
Attributed
Independent Variables
Groups: Number
Groups: Multiple
Recent Attacks: Last Year
Recent Attacks: Last Month
Fatalities
Target: Civilians
Target: Military/Diplomatic
Suicide Attack
Control Variables
ISIS claimed or attributed
% of ISIS attacks claimed
% of ISIS attacks attributed
AQ claimed or attributed
% of AQ attacks claimed
% of AQ attacks attributed
Armed Conflict: dummy
XPolity

Frequency Mean(SD)

Median Range

57.2%
16.0%
26.8%

-------

-------

-------

--96.2%
------53.8%
17.1%
5.5%

10.7 (11.0)

7

1–55

860.0 (953.1)
87.1 (97.2)
2.0 (10.9)
-------

533
53
0
-------

1–3926
0–503
0–1500
-------

4.3%
40.4%
59.6%
1.9%
39.7%
59.5%
84.3%
---

--------------3.9 (3.1)

--------------5

--------------−5, 7

The key independent variables in this study are: number of groups, number of recent
attacks, number of fatalities, military/diplomatic target, and suicide attack.73 For
hypothesis 1, I reshaped GTD data to measure the number of groups per countryyear.74 The number of groups is right-skewed so this variable is logged in
analyses.75 For hypothesis 2, I reshaped GTD data to measure the number attacks in a
country during the previous year. The number of attacks in the previous country-year is
right-skewed so it is logged for analyses.76 For hypotheses 3, I measured fatalities using
GTD data. I created a variable for the number of people killed in each attack excluding
the perpetrator(s). For hypothesis 4, I reshaped the GTD’s target type variable to create
a binary variable for whether the attack was against military or diplomatic targets.77 For
hypotheses 5 and 6, I interact fatalities with the respective binary variables for civilian

attacks78 and military or diplomatic attacks. Lastly, for hypothesis 7, I use the GTD’s
binary variable for suicide attacks.
Control variables
Armed conflict could impact claiming decisions for terrorism in multiple ways. On one
hand, groups may be more inclined to claim their attacks during conflict to signal
strength to both their opponent and to moderates. On the other hand, claims may be
less likely since the perpetrator would be clear based on the target.79 In these cases, we
may expect unclaimed attacks to be attributed since the likely perpetrators are implied.
Furthermore, the chaos inherent in war makes claiming—or even attributing—more
challenging.80 To account for the possible impact of armed conflict on claiming
decisions, I include a binary variable for the presence of armed conflict. Armed conflict
is measured using the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, which defined conflict as “a
contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of
armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state,
results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year.”81 The UCDP-PRIO
database codes at the incident-level and indicates the states involved in each conflict,
which includes extra-systemic war, interstate war, intrastate war, and internationalized
internal war.
Level of democracy may also impact claiming. Democratic states have more
freedom of the press, which could make it easier for a group to claim credit for an attack
and for that message to be transmitted to the public. Democratic states also have more
resources and motivation to investigate an attack to the point that it can be attributed to
a group. Democracy is measured using Vreeland’s adaptation82 from the Polity IV
scale.83 Vreeland argues that the variables on political participation are “‘contaminated’
by political violence” and excludes them from his measure of democracy.84 Vreeland’s
measure of democracy is more appropriate to avoid conceptual endogeneity.
AQ and ISIS
AQ and, more recently, ISIS have sought to garner as much attention as possible with
seemingly little concern about backlash. Both groups sometimes claim credit for attacks
that follow—or appear to follow—their ideology or goals even if the group was not
directly involved. To control for the impact that AQ and ISIS may have on claiming
behavior more broadly, I created binary variables for attacks that are either claimed by
or attributed to each group. Rather than control for AQ and ISIS attacks, I estimate
models with and without these incidents and compare results.

Results
The dependent variable in analyses is the claiming decision, which takes one of three
mutually exclusive values: unclaimed, claimed, or attributed. Thus, all models are

estimated using multinomial logistic regression with unclaimed attacks as the reference
category and standard errors clustered on the country. Results are reported using
relative risk ratios to ease interpretability of coefficients in much the same way that odds
ratios are used for logistic regression. To control for temporal issues—such as the rise
of social media and internet use—that may impact claims and attributions, I include year
dummies.
The main results tables show models estimated in two ways. First, I estimate models
where fatalities are coded as their actual values (0 to 1500 per attack). Second, since
99.98% of attacks have 200 or fewer fatalities, I top-coded fatalities at 200 for the 0.02%
of incidents where the fatalities were higher. As the tables show, results are
fundamentally the same. The models with fatalities top-coded at 200 are discussed in
text. As robustness checks, I also estimated models where fatalities were entered as: a)
a linear term only and no interactions; b) a linear term and a quadratic term but no
interactions; and, c) a logged term and interactions. These models are reported in the
appendix and show that results are consistent, which demonstrates that the
relationships discussed in text are not sensitive to modeling decisions.
Before reporting the main results, I first estimate a series of bivariate models to
examine the separate impact of each independent and control variable on claiming
decisions.85 As Table 3 shows, when considered separately, most variables have the
expected significant impact on both claims and attributions. There are, however, a few
exceptions. When other factors are not controlled for, the number of groups does not
impact the likelihood that an attack is claimed. Additionally, while I did not expect that
the number of recent attacks would impact attributions, the bivariate model shows a
significant negative relationship. There are, of course, many factors that may impact
claiming decisions for terrorist attacks. While the bivariate models show many
significant relationships, these factors do not occur in isolation. To test the relative
impact of each variable on claiming decisions when also accounting for other variables,
I next estimate full models where all independent and control variables are included.
Claimed attacks
As Table 4 Model 2 shows, most hypotheses about claiming are supported. Supporting
H1a, a one-unit increase in the logged number of groups in that country-year is
associated with a 36% increase in the likelihood that an attack is claimed. As expected
in H2a, the likelihood of claiming is reduced by 17% for each unit increase in the logged
number of attacks. Supporting H4a, attacks against military or diplomatic targets are
53% more likely to be claimed. Similarly, suicide attacks are 252% more likely to be
claimed, as expected in H7a.

Table 3. Bivariate multinomial regression models for each independent variable
separately (Table view)
Number of Groups (log)
Number of Groups (#)
Attacks Last Year (log)
Attacks Last Year (#)
Fatalities (top-coded 200)
Fatalities (#)
Fatalities (log)
Fatalities (top-coded 200)2
Civilian Target
Military/Diplomatic Target
Fatalities (top-coded 200) * Civilian
Fatalities (top-coded 200)2 * Civilian
Fatalities (top-coded 200) *
Military/Diplomatic
Fatalities (top-coded 200)2 *
Military/Diplomatic
Suicide Attack
XPolity
Armed Conflict
ISIS or AQ

Claimed
1.01 (0.01)
1.00 (0.001)
0.98*** (0.005)
0.99***
(0.00001)
1.06*** (0.002)
1.06*** (0.002)
1.05*** (0.002)
0.99***
(0.00002)
0.60*** (0.01)
2.08*** (0.05)
0.93*** (0.004)
1.00***
(0.00004)
1.06*** (0.007)

Attributed
0.74*** (0.007)
0.98*** (0.001)
0.88*** (0.004)
0.99*** (0.00001)

N
101,274
101,274
102,914
102,914

1.05*** (0.002)
1.05*** (0.002)
1.03*** (0.001)
0.99*** (0.00002)

97,838
97,838
97,838
97,838

0.88*** (0.01)
1.76*** (0.03)
0.96*** (0.004)
1.00*** (0.00004)

102,914
102,914
97,838
97,838

1.02*** (0.006)

97,838

0.99***
0.99† (0.000006) 97,838
(0.00005)
3.83*** (0.12)
1.23*** (0.04)
102,914
0.98*** (0.003) 1.00 (0.003)
85,477
0.50*** (0.01)
0.70*** (0.01)
102,914
741.95***
618.78***
102,914
(192.24)
(160.16)
Bivariate multinomial logistic regression models.
Relative risk ratios are presented with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.10. *p < 0.05. **p < 0 .01. ***p < 0.001.
Results show that both the raw count of fatalities and the squared term significantly
impact the likelihood that an attack is claimed. Figure 1 shows that the relationship
between claiming and fatalities is quadratic whereby claiming is least likely when there
are either a few or a lot of fatalities, as expected in H3a. Beyond just the number of
fatalities, it also matters who was killed.86 H5a expected that claiming would decrease
with more civilian fatalities, yet Figure 2 shows that this is not the case. Rather, claiming
increases with body count for civilian attacks and is quadratic for attacks against noncivilian targets. Contrary to expectations in H6a, the number of fatalities do not impact

claiming decisions for attacks against military or diplomatic targets. In the presence of
armed conflict, an attack is 58% less likely to be claimed. Over time, claiming increases
in 2015 and 2016, which may suggest a trend though it is too early to say this with
confidence.
Table 4. Claims and attributions (Table view)
Claimed
Model 1:
Fatalities2
Number of Groups
(log)
Attacks Last Year
(log)
Fatalities
Fatalities2
Civilian Target
Military/Diplomatic
Target
Fatalities * Civilian
Fatalities2 * Civilian
Fatalities *
Military/Diplomatic
Fatalities2 *
Military/Diplomatic
Suicide Attack

1.35*
(0.20)
0.83*
(0.07)
1.15***
(0.01)
0.9998***
(0.00003)
0.89 (0.17)
1.52**
(0.24)
0.92***
(0.02)
1.00***
(0.0003)
0.97 (0.03)

Model 2:
Fatalities2 & TopCoded Fatalities
at 200
1.36* (0.20)
0.83* (0.07)
1.17*** (0.02)
0.999*** (0.0001)
0.90 (0.17)
1.53** (0.24)
0.92*** (0.02)
1.00*** (0.0001)
0.97 (0.03)

Attributed
Model 3:
Fatalities2
0.92 (0.25)
0.79*
(0.08)
1.12**
(0.02)
0.9998***
(0.00002)
1.06 (0.10)
1.81**
(0.38)
0.94***
(0.02)
1.00**
(0.00004)
0.96 (0.03)

Model 4:
Fatalities2 & TopCoded Fatalities
at 200
0.93 (0.25)
0.79* (0.08)
1.14*** (0.02)
0.9994*** (0.0001)
1.04 (0.10)
1.90** (0.38)
0.94*** (0.02)
1.00** (0.0001)
0.96 (0.03)

1.00***
1.00 (0.0002)
1.00***
1.00 (0.0001)
(0.0003)
(0.00003)
3.62***
3.52*** (0.62)
1.13 (0.29) 1.30 (0.28)
(0.63)
XPolity
1.03 (0.04) 1.03 (0.04)
1.05 (0.04) 1.05 (0.04)
Armed Conflict
0.42***
0.42*** (0.10)
0.75 (0.27) 0.75 (0.26)
(0.10)
N
80,286
80,286
80,286
80,286
Multinomial logistic regression models. i.year coefficients and constants not reported.
Relative risk ratios are presented with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.10. *p < 0.05. **p < 0 .01. ***p < 0.001.

Figure 1. Fatalities and claiming decisions

Figure 2. Fatalities and claiming decisions by civilian target

Attributed attacks
As Table 4 Model 4 shows, few of the hypotheses about attributions are supported and
significant results are found in the opposite direction as expected in a few instances.
Supporting H4b, attacks against military or diplomatic targets are 90% more likely to be
attributed. I did not expect that, on balance, the number of recent attacks could impact
likelihood of attributions since unease among the population should increase attributions
while the noisy environment would make attributions more difficult. Yet, results show
that a one-unit increase in the logged number of recent attacks decreases the likelihood
of attribution by 21% (H2b), which suggests that—on balance—the noisy environment
has a stronger depressive effect on attributions. Contrary to expectation, the number of
active groups (H1b) does not impact the likelihood that an attack is attributed. Similarly,
there is no relationship between suicide attacks (H7b) and attributions.
Fatalities impact the likelihood that an attack is attributed to a group. Figure 1 shows
that—similar to the relationship between fatalities and claims—attacks are less likely to
be attributed when there are either a few or a lot of fatalities, which supports H3b. As
with claims, who is killed also impacts attributions. While H5a expected that attributions
would increase with civilian fatalities, Figure 2 shows that the actual relationship is
curvilinear whereby attributions are less likely for attacks with the fewest or most civilian
deaths. For attacks against military or diplomatic targets, fatalities do not impact
attributions (H6b). Neither level of democracy nor armed conflict impacts attributions.
Additionally, attributions were more likely in 2015 only.
Comparing claims and attributions
Comparing the models in Table 4, some results are similar whereas others show
meaningful differences across the outcomes. Two predictors—the number of active
groups and being a suicide attack—impact the likelihood of claiming but not attributions.
Further, claims are less likely during war but attributions are unaffected. Across the
other independent variables, the directionality of each significant predictor is the same
for both claims and attributions. However, comparison of marginal effects show that the
magnitude of these results differ. The probability of being attributed is 3.6% lower than
the probability of being claimed when there were more attacks in the previous year
(p = 0.014) and 1.2% lower than the probability of being claimed when there were more
fatalities (p < 0.001). The probability of being attributed is 9.8% higher when the target is
military or diplomatic (p = 0.005).
Results show that contextual and attack-level factors have different impacts on
whether an attack is claimed or is unclaimed but attributed to a specific group. Extant
literature has generally treated claiming as dichotomous, which limits our understanding
of claiming behaviors. To demonstrate that results would be different if claiming had
been dichotomized in this study, Table 5 presents the models reported in Table 4 using

binary dependent variables for whether or not an attack is claimed (0 = no claim; 1 = at
least one claim) and whether or not an attack is claimed or attributed (0 = no claim or
attribution; 1 = claimed or attributed).
Table 5. Comparing any claim v. no claim & claim or attribution v. unclaimed (Table
view)
Any Claim
Model 5:
Fatalities2 Full

Number of Groups
(log)
Attacks Last Year
(log)
Fatalities
Fatalities2

1.39** (0.15)

Model 6:
Fatalities2 &
Top-Coded
Fatalities at
200
1.39** (0.15)

Any Claim or Attribution
Model 7:
Model 8:
Fatalities2 Full Fatalities2 &
Top-Coded
Fatalities at
200
1.06 (0.22)
1.06 (0.22)

0.92 (0.05)

0.91 (0.05)

0.80* (0.07)

0.80* (0.07)

1.06*** (0.02)
0.9999**
(0.00002)
0.86 (0.17)
1.18 (0.16)

1.09*** (0.02)
0.9995**
(0.0001)
0.88 (0.16)
1.21 (0.16)

1.14*** (0.02)
0.9998***
(0.00002)
0.99 (0.11)
1.75** (0.31)

1.15**** (0.02)
0.9993***
(0.0001)
0.99 (0.11)
1.75** (0.31)

Civilian Target
Military/Diplomatic
Target
Fatalities * Civilian 0.96** (0.01)
0.94*** (0.02)
0.93*** (0.02) 0.93*** (0.02)
2
Fatalities * Civilian 1.00**
1.00** (0.0001) 1.00**
1.00** (0.0001)
(0.0002)
(0.00003)
Fatalities *
0.99 (0.01)
0.98 (0.2)
0.96 (0.03)
0.96 (0.03)
Military/Diplomatic
Fatalities2 *
1.00*
1.00 (0.0002)
1.00***
1.00 (0.0001)
Military/Diplomatic (0.00002)
(0.00003)
Suicide Attack
3.45*** (0.50) 3.26*** (0.47)
2.15*** (0.32) 2.11*** (0.31)
XPolity
1.01 (0.04)
1.01 (0.04)
1.04 (0.04)
1.05 (0.04)
Armed Conflict
0.48** (0.14)
0.48** (0.14)
0.61* (0.14)
0.61* (0.14)
N
80,286
80,286
80,286
80,286
iLogistic regression models. i.year coefficients and constants not reported.
Odds ratios are presented with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.10. *p < 0.05. **p < 0 .01. ***p < 0.001.
Results are noticeably different between both sets of models in Table 5 and when
comparing models in Table 5 to those in Table 4. Comparing models on Table
5 (Models 6 and 8), we see that three variables—number of groups, number of recent
attacks, and military or diplomatic targets—are significant in one model but not the
other. This shows that modeling decisions—specifically whether to combine attributed

attacks with unclaimed ones or with claimed ones—impact results. Comparing Model 2
to Model 6, we see two main differences: neither the number of recent attacks nor
attacking a military or diplomatic target are significant when claiming is treated as
binary. Similarly, comparing Model 2 to Model 8, the number of groups is not significant
when claims and attributions are combined into a single category. Further, while the
other variables have the same statistical impact on claiming, the magnitude of the
effects differ for military targets and suicide attacks. Finally, comparing Models 6 and 8,
we again see key differences in the significance of: number of groups, number of recent
attacks, and military or diplomatic targets. In sum, disaggregating claiming behavior
beyond a binary measure expands our understanding of factors that impact the
likelihood that an attack will either be claimed or be unclaimed but attributed to a
specific group.
What impact do Al Qaeda and ISIS have on the results?
In recent years, AQ and ISIS have dominated discourse on global terrorism. Despite
ISIS’s relatively short duration, 4.3% of attacks in this dataset were either claimed by or
attributed to the group. In 2015 alone, ISIS was connected to 10.7% of all attacks. AQ,
which has been active for longer than ISIS, has either claimed or is believed to be
responsible for 1.9% of attacks in this dataset. In its most active year, 2012, AQ was
connected to 6.0% of all attacks. Results may be impacted by these groups’
prominence, preferences for claiming, and frequency of attributions. To test whether AQ
and ISIS impact results, I estimate the same models reported in Table 4 but without
attacks attributed to or claimed by either of these groups. Results of the models without
AQ and ISIS attacks are shown in Table 6. The results are partially the same, but there
are a few key differences. When AQ and ISIS attacks are removed from analyses, the
likelihood of claiming is no longer impacted by the number of groups or the number of
recent attacks. Otherwise, the results are statistically the same and substantively
similar.
Discussion
This project examined factors that impact when a terrorist attack is likely to be claimed
versus unclaimed but attributed to a specific group. Using GTD data, I found that
competition, attack characteristics, and context impact claiming decisions for terrorism.
While Hoffman found that more competition increased claiming in Israel,87 Wright did
not find support for this globally.88 More recently, Abrahms and Conrad’s findings were
inconclusive and dependent on operationalization.89 In the present study, an increase in
the number of active groups in a country-year increased the likelihood of claims but did
not impact attributions. Results support Kydd and Walter’s expectation that outbidding
would be more likely with additional groups.90 However, when a claim is not made, the
more competitive environment may also be noisier, which makes attributions more

challenging.91 Disaggregating claims and attributions may help to explain the
contradictory findings in previous research.
Table 6. Claims and attributions with ISIS and Al-Qaeda attacks removed (Table view)

Number of Groups
(log)
Attacks Last Year
(log)
Fatalities
Fatalities2

Claimed without ISIS/AQ
Attacks
Model 9:
Model 10:
Fatalities2 Full Fatalities2 &
Top-Coded
Fatalities at
200
†
1.74 (0.53)
1.74† (0.53)

Attributed without ISIS/AQ
Attacks
Model 11:
Model 12:
Fatalities2 Full Fatalities2 &
Top-Coded
Fatalities at
200
1.05 (0.36)
1.05 (0.36)

0.72† (0.14)

0.72† (0.14)

0.71† (0.14)

0.71† (0.14)

1.16*** (0.03)
0.999**
(0.002)
0.85 (0.19)
1.54* (0.30)

1.17*** (0.03)
0.999***
(0.002)
0.86 (0.19)
1.56* (0.30)

1.12*** (0.02)
0.999***
(0.00009)
0.99 (0.11)
1.89** (0.44)

1.12*** (0.02)
0.999***
(0.00009)
0.98 (0.11)
1.90** (0.44)

Civilian Target
Military/Diplomatic
Target
Fatalities * Civilian 0.90*** (0.02) 0.90*** (0.02)
0.95* (0.02)
0.95* (0.02)
2
Fatalities * Civilian 1.00**
1.00** (0.0002) 1.00**
1.00 (0.0001)
(0.0002)
(0.00009)
Fatalities *
0.97 (0.04)
0.97 (0.04)
0.95 (0.03)
0.95 (0.03)
Military/Diplomatic
Fatalities2 *
1.00 (0.003)
1.00 (0.003)
1.00 (0.0002)
1.00 (0.0002)
Military/Diplomatic
Suicide Attack
2.76*** (0.51) 2.75*** (0.52)
0.91 (0.30)
0.90 (0.29)
XPolity
1.02 (0.06)
1.02 (0.06)
1.05 (0.06)
1.05 (0.06)
Armed Conflict
0.39** (0.13)
0.39** (0.13)
0.93 (0.40)
0.93 (0.40)
N
75,176
75,176
75,176
75,176
Multinomial logistic regression models. i.year coefficients and constants not reported.
Relative risk ratios are presented with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.10. *p < 0.05. **p < 0 .01. ***p < 0.001.

Competition can also be measured by the amount of recent violence. Results show
that more recent attacks decrease the likelihood of both claims and attributions, which
suggests that groups are sensitive to the population’s tolerance for violence. Insofar as
the goal of terrorism is to generate fear, this can be accomplished even without a

claim.92 Further, more recent attacks could increase the risk of reprisal, which would
also decrease claiming.93 Additionally, an increase in recent attacks may strain state
and public resources, which makes it easier for claims to get lost in the shuffle and
makes it more difficult to identify the group responsible for any particular attack.94
Results of this project clearly show that attack-level factors also impact claiming
behaviors. Supporting previous research, suicide attacks are significantly more likely to
be claimed.95 Yet, suicide attacks do not impact attributions. Non-suicide attacks are
claimed 14.1% of the time whereas 37.7% of suicide attacks are claimed. Perhaps this
high rate of claiming helps to explain why suicide attacks do not impact attributions.
Also supporting prior research, results here show that attacks against the military or
diplomatic missions are more likely to be claimed.96 Similarly, attacks against military or
diplomatic targets are more likely to be attributed. As a point of caution with these
conclusions, some attacks against military are excluded from the GTD because they
occur in the context of legitimate warfare and fail to meet one of the GTD’s other two
inclusion criteria: “be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal”;
and, “evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a
larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.” As such, it is possible that
results related to military attacks are partially a function of the dataset’s inclusion
criteria, which could be explored in future research using other datasets. Partially
supporting LaFree et al.’s97 notion that war creates a noisy environment, armed conflict
reduces the likelihood that an attack is claimed. Attributions, however, are not impacted
by conflict. Level of democracy has no impact on claiming decisions.
Prior research does not clearly show a relationship between fatalities and claims.
Abrahms and Conrad found that high fatality attacks were more likely to be claimed—
though this was only the case in some of their models and had no effect in
others.98 Results from the present study suggest that the relationship between fatalities
and both claims and attributions is quadratic. In short, claims and attributions are both
less likely for attacks with the fewest and the most fatalities. Furthermore, the impact
that fatalities have on claiming decisions is a function of who is killed. For attacks
against civilians, claiming is more likely as the body count rises, which contradicts
expectations.99 This suggests that groups perceive that the notoriety and support
generated from high fatality attacks will outweigh potential backlash. Contrary to
expectation, the relationship between attributions and fatalities for civilian targeted
attacks is curvilinear whereby attributions are less likely for attacks with the fewest and
the most killed. Since high fatality attacks are relatively rare and, as results here show,
they are more likely to be claimed, there may simply be fewer high fatality attacks to be
attributed, which could explain this finding. Contrasting with Abrahms and Conrad’s
findings,100 in this present study there is no relationship between fatalities against
military or diplomatic targets and either claims or attributions. It may be that attacks

against military or diplomatic targets are more likely to be both claimed and attributed
regardless of body count.
In sum, these findings advance our understanding of claiming decisions in three key
ways. First, disaggregating beyond a binary measure of claiming shows variation across
a few variables and similarities across others. Two factors—the number of active groups
and suicide attacks—increase claims but not attributions. As fatalities rise in civilian
targeted attacks, claims increase whereas attributes have a curvilinear relationship with
fatalities. Further, armed conflict decreases the likelihood of claims but does not impact
attributions. While other factors have the same directional impact on both claims and
attributions, the magnitude of those effects are different for recent attacks, fatalities, and
attacking a military or diplomatic target. For some studies, it may not matter if claims
and attributions are separated out, whereas collapsing claiming decisions into a
dichotomous measure may produce biased results in other studies. Results also help to
address conflicting findings in the literature while expanding scholarly understanding of
factors that impact claiming decisions for terrorism. Second, findings are fundamentally
similar regardless of whether ISIS and AQ attacks are included. This suggests that ISIS
and AQ have not changed the nature of claiming decisions. Third, despite technological
advances that should make it easier to claim and to attribute terrorism, actual claiming
decisions do not appear to be changing over time.
Conclusion
This project is a step toward empirically testing propositions about claiming decisions for
terrorism. By expanding our understanding of claiming decisions in terrorism, this
project has implications for research and policy. Rationalist explanations for terrorism
have long focused on the communicative nature of the actions where claiming is
essential. Yet, data show that claims are rare for terrorism. As the frequency of
unclaimed attacks has grown, it is increasingly important to understand when and why
some attacks are claimed, while others are attributed to a group. To date, there has
been a dearth of research on unclaimed attacks and the research that does exist tends
to treat claiming as a binary event. Thus, little is presently known about which groups
are least likely to claim their attacks, when groups may be more likely to claim attacks,
and why claiming is generally so low. The present study builds our understanding of
claiming decisions, which can improve data issues to both build better models and
improve inclusion criteria for group or ideology focused research. Further,
disaggregating claiming decisions shows some meaningful differences, which can
inform future research. With more complete theoretical and empirical research, we can
start to predict when claims and attributions will be more or less likely, when to take
claims seriously, and when to think groups are lying—all of which can improve
counterterrorism responses. Additionally, raising public awareness that claims are rare

for terrorism can help to quell the fear that stems from uncertainty about responsibility
for an attack.
While the present study expands our understanding of claiming behavior, it is not
without limitations. The main limitations of this project stem from the clandestine nature
of terrorism. Specifically, we cannot model group-level factors since these variables
are—by definition—missing when the responsible group is unknown. While about a
quarter of attacks are attributed, it is likely that at least some of these implicate the
wrong group. Further, even when an attack is claimed, we cannot know for sure that the
group is truly responsible and this becomes even more tenuous when there are multiple
claims. These are unavoidable limitations in studying claiming behavior for terrorism.
Like any dataset, the GTD is not definitive. The two most commonly used terrorism
datasets, by definition, include different cases since ITERATE focuses on transnational
attacks while the GTD also includes domestic attacks.101 Patterns for claims and
attributions may vary between these datasets. Similarly, attacks may appear in statelevel terrorism datasets that are absent from the GTD.102, 103 National terrorism datasets
may display different patterns for claims and attributions at the state level. Further, the
GTD excludes terrorism by state actors. Presumably, state actors would be less inclined
to claim credit for their violence for fear of retaliation from other states, though
attributions of responsibility may be greater. Further, factors that impact claiming
decisions may differ for state actors as compares to the non-state actors examined in
this study.
The present study suggests a few avenues for future research. First, research
should examine whether the results found here are consistent across datasets. Second,
research should examine the extent to which claiming decisions are similar between
state and non-state actors. Third, quantitative analyses presented here show aggregate
trends, but this work would be enhanced by qualitative work focusing on how claiming
decisions have been made by actual organizations and their members. Finally, recent
advances in data also allow us to gather geo-coded information about attacks. Geocoded data can be used to provide a sub-national and micro-level explanation for
claiming with the goal to eventually be able to predict the group responsible. Future
research could incorporate geo-coded data to model claiming behavior for terrorism in a
region with the aim to predict what group is likely responsible for unclaimed and
unattributed violence.
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Appendix
Table A1. Cross tabulations for binary independent variables (Table view)
Claimed # (% in
this column)

Attributed # (% in
this column)

Civilian Target

No 9,266 (19.5%)
Yes 7,238 (13.1%)

12,825 (27.0%)
14,754 (26.7%)

Unclaimed
# (% in this
column)
25,464 (53.5%)
33,367 (60.3%)

Military/Diplomatic
Target

No 12,545 (14.7%)
Yes 3,959 (22.6%)

21,731 (25.5%)
5,848 (33.3%)

51,093 (59.8%)
7,738 (44.1%)

Suicide Attack

No 14,338 (14.7%)
Yes 2,166 (38.2%)

26,306 (27.1%)
1,273 (22.5%)

56,601 (58.2%)
2,230 (39.3%)

Armed Conflict

No 3,703 (22.9%)
Yes 12,801 (14.8%)

5,126 (31.7%)
22,453 (25.9%)

7,356 (45.4%)
51,475 (59.4%)

ISIS or AQ

No 13,878 (14.4%)
Yes 2,626 (41.0%)

23,820 (24.7%)
3,759 (58.7%)

58,816 (60.9%)
15 (0.2%)

Table A2. Claims and attributions with alternative model specifications (Table view)
Claimed
Linear Quadratic

Attributed
Linear Quadratic

Logged
Logged
Fatalities
Fatalities
Number of Groups 1.35*
1.35* (0.20) 1.39*
0.92
0.92
0.94
(log)
(0.20)
(0.20)
(0.25)
(0.25)
(0.25)
Attacks Last Year
0.83*
0.83* (0.07) 0.81*
0.79*
0.79*
0.77*
(log)
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
Fatalities
1.07*** 1.08***
1.07*** 1.07***
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
Fatalities2
0. 9998***
0. 9998***
(0.000007)
(0.00006)
Fatalities (log)
1.87***
1.46***
(0.11)
(0.09)
Civilian Target
0.79
0.79 (0.16) 0.99
0.99
0.99
1.01
(0.16)
(0.18)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.11)
Military/Diplomatic 1.49*
1.49* (0.23) 1.51*
1.82** 1.82**
1.92**
Target
(0.23)
(0.26)
(0.33)
(0.33)
(0.40)
Fatalities (log) *
0.73***
0.99
Civilian
(0.06)
(0.08)
Fatalities (log) *
0.96
0.92
Military/Diplomatic
(0.11)
(0.08)
Suicide Attack
3.80*** 3.79***
3.67***
1.35
1.34
1.40
(0.65)
(0.65)
(0.61)
(0.31)
(0.30)
(0.30)
XPolity
1.03
1.03 (0.04) 1.03
1.05
1.05
1.05
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.04)
Armed Conflict
0.43*** 0.43***
0.42***
0.75
0.75
0.75
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.27)
(0.27)
(0.26)
N
80,286 80,286
80,286
80,286 80,286
80,286
Multinomial logistic regression models. i.year coefficients and constants not reported.
Relative risk ratios are presented with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.10. *p < 0.05. **p < 0 .01. ***p < 0.001.

Table A3. Comparing any claim v. no claim & claim or attribution v. unclaimed with
alternative model specifications (Table view)
Any Claim
Linear Quadratic

Any Claim or Attribution
Logged
Linear Quadratic Logged
Fatalities
Fatalities
Number of Groups 1.39** 1.39**
1.42**
1.06
1.06
1.09
(log)
(0.15) (0.15)
(0.15)
(0.22) (0.22)
(0.22)
†
Attacks Last Year 0.92
0.92 (0.05) 0.90 (0.05) 0.80*
0.80*
0.78*
(log)
(0.05)
(0.07) (0.07)
(0.07)
Fatalities
1.02*
1.02**
1.07*** 1.07***
(0.008) (0.008)
(0.01) (0.01)
2
Fatalities
0.9999*
0.9998***
(0.000005)
(0.00001)
Fatalities (log)
1.63***
1.63***
(0.10)
(0.08)
Civilian Target
0.80
0.80 (0.15) 0.99 (0.17) 0.91
0.91
1.00
(0.15)
(0.10) (0.10)
(0.11)
Military/Diplomatic 1.19
1.19 (0.16) 1.21 (0.18) 1.68** 1.68**
1.75**
Target
(0.16)
(0.27) (0.27)
(0.33)
Fatalities (log) *
0.72***
0.87*
Civilian
(0.06)
(0.05)
Fatalities (log) *
0.95 (0.08)
0.93
Military/Diplomatic
(0.09)
Suicide Attack
3.68*** 3.63***
3.19***
2.24*** 2.24***
2.24***
(0.52) (0.51)
(0.44)
(0.33) (0.33)
(0.33)
XPolity
1.01
1.01 (0.04) 1.01 (0.04) 1.04
1.04
1.05
(0.04)
(0.04) (0.04)
(0.04)
Armed Conflict
0.48*
0.48*
0.48* (0.14) 0.61*
0.61*
0.61*
(0.14) (0.14)
(0.14) (0.14)
(0.14)
N
80,286 80,286
80,286
80,286 80,286
80,286
Logistic regression models. i.year coefficients and constants not reported.
†p < 0.10. *p < 0.05. **p < 0 .01. ***p < 0.001.
Odds ratios are presented with clustered standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4. Claims and attributions with ISIS and Al-Qaeda attacks removed with
alternative model specifications (Table view)
Claimed without ISIS/AQ Attacks Attributed without ISIS/AQ Attacks
Linear
Quadratic Logged
Linear
Quadratic Logged
Fatalities
Fatalities
Number of
1.74† (0.5 1.74† (0.5 1.85† (0.5 1.05
1.05
1.07
Groups (log)
3)
3)
4)
(0.36)
(0.36)
(0.37)
†
†
†
†
†
Attacks Last
0.73 (0.1 0.73 (0.1 0.71 (0.1 0.71 (0.1 0.71 (0.1 0.69† (0.1
Year (log)
4)
4)
3)
4)
4)
3)
Fatalities
1.07***
1.08***
1.06***
1.07***
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
2
Fatalities
0.999***
1.00***
(0.00005)
(0.00006)
Fatalities (log)
1.87***
1.45***
(0.13)
(0.10)
Civilian Target 0.74
0.74
0.97
0.94
0.94
0.96
(0.18)
(0.18)
(0.20)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.11)
Military/Diplom 1.53**
1.53*
1.53*
1.79**
1.79**
1.93**
atic Target
(0.30)
(0.30)
(0.32)
(0.39)
(0.39)
(0.46)
Fatalities (log) *
0.65***
0.99
Civilian
(0.07)
(0.10)
Fatalities (log) *
0.96
0.88
Military/Diplom
(0.13)
(0.09)
atic
Suicide Attack
2.99***
2.93***
2.91***
0.94
0.93
0.95
(0.53)
(0.53)
(0.50)
(0.32)
(0.30)
(0.29)
XPolity
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.05
1.05
1.05
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.06)
Armed Conflict 0.39**
0.39**
0.39**
0.93
0.93
0.92
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.40)
(0.40)
(0.40)
N
75,176
75,176
75,176
75,176
75,176
75,176
Multinomial logistic regression models. i.year coefficients and constants not reported.
Relative risk ratios are presented with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.10. *p < 0.05. **p < 0 .01. ***p < 0.001.

